According to the Laplacian definition, the probability of an event is the ratio of “favorable” cases to possible cases. It is obvious that the definition presupposes the equal probability of the possible cases; and to make the definition of probability depend upon the conception of equal probability has the appearance, at least, of a vicious circle. Moreover it is hard to see how we can assure ourselves that each possible case is really no more and no less probable than any (...) other. But even if we define probability as the relative frequency of occurrence of events under a given set of conditions, or of true conclusions from premises of a given type, we still require the conception of equal probability, unless indeed we choose to renounce entirely the mathematical expression and calculation of probabilities. (shrink)

Recent advances in quantum physics have led to a renewal of interest in the problem of human freedom and in the wider problem of indeterminism. It is important to recognize, however, that if every denial of determinism is to be called indeterminism, the latter term covers a wide range of logically distinguishable positions. We should perhaps speak in the plural number of indeterminisms rather than of indeterminism. For determinism may be defined, simply, as the doctrine that every event has a (...) cause; or we may add that the effect is always uniquely determined; or that when the effect is complex it can always be exhaustively analyzed into components each of which is the effect of a component of the cause; or that every cause directly or indirectly includes the entire universe. And in the case of each of these, or of still other interpretations of determinism, the denial would be a form of indeterminism. (shrink)

In a recent number of Philosophy of Science, Mr. C. D. Hardie offers some interesting suggestions concerning the problem of other minds. In his view the fact that we feel certain of their existence constitutes a problem; and he wishes to find a rational justification for this certainty. “What grounds have I for believing in the existence of other minds?” he asks. He is attracted by the traditional argument from analogy, but finds it incomplete; for “any conclusion arrived at by (...) analogy and induction is at best only probable,” and “I am certain that other minds exist.” Again we find him remarking that “there is room for an account which makes our knowledge of them depend in some way on analogy... but which is such that we can be certain that other minds exist....”. (shrink)

As a first step in the larger project of charting the ontology of computer programs, we pose three central questions: (1) Can programs, hardware, and metaprograms be organized into a meaningful taxonomy? (2) To what ontology are computer programs committed? (3) What explains the proliferation of programming languages and how do they come about? Taking the complementary perspectives software engineering and mathematical logic, we take inventory of programs and related objects and conclude that the notions of abstraction and concretization take (...) a central role in this investigation. (shrink)

In his presidential address on “Symbols, Signs, and Signals,” given before the Association for Symbolic Logic, December 28, 1938, Professor C. J. Ducasse made and important distinction between what he there called the indicative and the quiddative symbol. He remarked in passing that he thought it possible to show that: 1) “The same entity may function both as indicative and as quiddative symbol: or one part of a complex symbol may be quiddative and another indicative”; and 2) “the difference between (...) the two roles is irreducible: the indicative is not a species of the quiddative nor vice versa.” An indicative symbol is defined as “one of which the distinctive property is to orient our attention to some place in an order system …”; and a quiddative symbol as “one of which the distinctive property is to make us conceive a certain kind of thing—a certain ‘what'—no matter where in any order system it may or may not be existing.”. (shrink)

Written by leading theorists and empirical researchers, this book presents new ways of addressing the old question: Why did religion first emerge and then continue to evolve in all human societies? The authors of the book--each with a different background across the social sciences and humanities -- assimilate conceptual leads and empirical findings from anthropology, evolutionary biology, evolutionary sociology, neurology, primate behavioral studies, explanations of human interaction and group dynamics, and a wide range of religious scholarship to construct a deeper (...) and more powerful explanation of the origins and subsequent evolutionary development of religions than can be currently found in what is now vast literature. While explaining religion has been a central question in many disciplines for a long time, this book draws upon a much wider array of literatures to develop a robust and cross-disciplinary analysis of religion. The book remains true to its subtitle by emphasizing an array of both biological and sociocultural forms of selection dynamics that are fundamental to explaining religion as a universal institution in human societies. In addition to Darwinian selection, which can explain the biology and neurology of religion, the book outlines a set of four additional types of sociocultural natural selection that can explain fill out the explanation of why religion first emerged as an institutional system in human societies, and why it has continued to evolve over the last 200,000 years of societal evolution. These sociocultural forms of natural selection are labeled by the names of the early sociologists who first emphasized them; and these can be seen as a necessary supplement to the type of natural selection theorized by Charles Darwin. Explanations of religion that remain in the shadow cast by Darwin's great insights will, it is argued, remain narrow and incomplete when explaining a robust sociocultural phenomena like religion. (shrink)

In this amazingly prophetic work, done late in his career, Herbert Spencer offers an approach to ethics that anticipates developments throughout the twentieth century. He moves away from the twin evils of ethical doctrines bequeathed to us by an ancient past that are simply no longer feasible but also avoids modern standards of ethical conduct that are simply impossible to attain. "By association with rules that cannot be obeyed," Spencer writes, "rules that can be obeyed lose their authority." The volume (...) opens with three chapters on conduct: its evolution, good and bad, and ways of judgment. This is followed by a series of chapters that examine ethics from a variety of scientific perspectives: physics, biology, psychology, and sociology. The work then moves on to specific issues of deep human concern: the relativity of pleasures and pain, egoism versus altruism in explaining actions, and trial and compromise in decision-making about ethical concerns. Spencer's work anticipates the movement toward pragmatic, naturalistic, and even positivist approaches to ethics. He emphasizes that a relativist approach while in keeping with the spirit of the industrial age, also poses a variety of problems that admit only of empirical solutions. He understands that his critical stance on absolutism should not blind researchers to the ideals assumed by the ancients that assist people in their everyday living. In short, this is a remarkable work, entirely modern, and yet containing a sharp evaluation of how ethical data serve to enhance ethical conduct. (shrink)